This paper investigates the detection of communication outbreaks among a small team of actors in time-varying networks. We propose monitoring plans for known and unknown teams based on generalizations of the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) statistic. For unknown teams, we propose an efficient neighborhood-based search to estimate a collection of candidate teams. This procedure dramatically reduces the computational complexity of an exhaustive search. Our procedure consists of two steps: communication counts between actors are first smoothed using a multivariate EWMA strategy. Densely connected teams are identified as candidates using a neighborhood search approach. These candidate teams are then monitored using a surveillance plan derived from a generalized EWMA statistic. Monitoring plans are established for collaborative teams, teams with a dominant leader, as well as for global outbreaks. We consider weighted heterogeneous dynamic networks, where the expected communication count between each pair of actors is potentially different across pairs and time, as well as homogeneous networks, where the expected communication count is constant across time and actors. Our monitoring plans are evaluated on a test bed of simulated networks as well as on the U.S. Senate co-voting network, which models the Senate voting patterns from 1857 to 2015. Our analysis suggests that our surveillance strategies can efficiently detect relevant and significant changes in dynamic networks.
Introduction
In many applications, it is of interest to identify anomalous behavior among the actors in a time-varying network. For example in online social networks, sudden increased communications often signify illegal behavior such as fraud or collusion (Pandit et al., 2007; Savage et al., 2014) . Anomalous changes like these are reflected by local structural changes in the network. The goal of network monitoring is to provide a surveillance plan that can detect such structural changes. Network monitoring techniques have been successfully utilized in a number of applications, including the identification of central players in terrorist groups (Krebs, 2002; Reid et al., 2005; Porter and White, 2012) , and the detection of fraud in online networks (Chau et al., 2006; Pandit et al., 2007; Akoglu and Faloutsos, 2013) . As available data has become more complex, there has been a recent surge of interest in the development and application of scalable network monitoring methodologies (see Savage et al. (2014) and Woodall et al. (2016) for recent reviews).
In this paper, we investigate monitoring the interactions of a fixed collection of n actors
[n] = {1, . . . , n} over discrete times t = 1, . . . , T . In general, an interaction is broadly defined and may represent, for example, communications in an online network (Prusiewicz, 2008) , citations in a co-authorship network (Liu et al., 2005) , or gene-gene interactions in a biological network (Parker et al., 2015) . We model the interactions of these actors at time t by a n × n stochastic adjacency matrix Y t = (y i,j,t ), where y i,j,t is the discrete random variable that represents the number of interactions between actor i and actor j at time t.
Our goal is to develop a surveillance strategy to detect communication outbreaks among a subset of actors Ω t ⊆ [n] at time t.
The identification of outbreaks among a subset of actors Ω t corresponds to detecting sudden increases in the collection of edges {y i,j,t : i, j ∈ Ω t }. When the team is unknown, monitoring can be computationally expensive due to the need for identifying candidate teams.
For example, consider a simple case where we know the size of the target team is n Ωt = |Ω t |.
An exhaustive monitoring of all teams of size n Ωt requires a procedure of complexity n n Ω t ≈ n n Ω t , which is infeasible even for moderately sized networks. As social networks are generally large, e.g. n is on the order of 1 million for online networks like those represesenting Facebook or Twitter, exhaustive searches are not practical in real-time. To address this challenge, we propose a computationally efficient local surveillance strategy that monitors the interactions of densely connected neighborhoods through time. Our proposed strategy has computational complexity of order n 2 , and provides a viable strategy for large networks.
Our surveillance procedure consists of two steps, which can be briefly described as follows.
First, we smooth the communication counts across all pairs and time using a multivariate adaptation of the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) technique for smoothing
Poisson counts. By monitoring the smoothed counts, our strategy is robust to sudden random oscillations in the observed count process. Next, candidate teams are identified locally for each node using a neighborhood-based approach. In particular, at time t we define a candidate team for node i ∈ [n] as one that contains larger than expected communication.
Surveillance plans for these candidate teams are developed using appropriate generalizations of the multivariate EWMA statistic.
We develop surveillance plans using the above technique in general for heterogeneous (ii) Dominant leader teams: the members of Ω t have a dominant leader ν who communicates frequently with members of Ω t , but the members of Ω t themselves do not necessarily communicate frequently amongst themselves.
(iii) Global outbreaks: the entire network undergoes a communication outbreak, namely
Scenarios (i) and (ii) are considered for both unknown and known teams. Each of the scenarios are also considered for homogeneous networks, where E[y i,j,t ] ≡ λ. By investigating both a test bed of simulated networks as well as a real network describing the U.S. Senate voting patterns, we find that our surveillance strategy can efficiently and reliably detect significant changes in dynamic networks.
Related Work
The most closely related work to our current manuscript is that introduced in Heard et al. (2010) et al. (2016) proposed modeling and estimating change in a sequence of networks using the dynamic degree-corrected stochastic block model (DCSBM). In that work, maximum likelihood estimates of the DCSBM are used for monitoring via Shewhart control charts.
Our model is similar to the DCSBM in that edges are modeled as having discrete-valued edge-weights, which flexibly model communications in social networks.
The EWMA control chart is a popular univariate monitoring technique. The multivariate EWMA process that we use here is a generalization of the univariate EWMA strategies for
Poisson counts considered in Weiß (2007 ), Sparks et al. (2009 , and Zhou et al. (2012) . A related multivariate EWMA control chart has previously been successfully applied to space-time monitoring of crime (Zeng et al., 2004; Kim and O' Kelly, 2008; Neill, 2009; Nakaya and Yano, 2010) .
Our specified dynamic network model for Y = {Y 1 , . . . , Y T } is related to several well-studied random graph models, which are ubiquitous in social network analysis. For example, when y i,j,t are independent and identically distributed Poisson(λ) random variables, the graph at time t is an Erdős-Rényi random graph model with edge connection probability λ (Erdös and Rényi, 1960) . On the other hand, when y i,j,t are independent Poisson(λ i,j,t ) random variables, graph t is a weighted variant of the Chung-Lu random graph model (Aiello et al., 2000) . Random graph models play an important role in the statistical analysis of relational data. Goldenberg et al. (2010) provides a recent survey about random graph models and their applications.
Organization of this Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe how to smooth the observed communication counts using multivariate EWMA smoothing. In Section 3 we develop surveillance strategies for communication outbreaks among small teams of actors in a dynamic network when the target team is known. We consider collaborative teams, dominant leader teams, as well as global outbreaks. Section 4 describes our proposed local search and monitoring approach for unknown target teams. Section 5 investigates the performance of our surveillance strategies on a test-bed of simulated networks. We make recommendations on designing the plans in such a way to minimize false discovery. In Section 6, we further assess the performance of our strategy by applying the plans to the heterogeneous network describing the U.S. Senate voting patterns from the 35th to the 113th
Congress. We conclude with a summary of our findings and discuss directions for future work in Section 7.
Temporal EWMA Smoothing of Interactions
Throughout this work, we are concerned with detecting significant increases in communication among the members of some subset of actors Ω t ⊆ [n]. Such fluctations correspond to sudden spikes in the collection of edge weights {y i,j,t : i, j ∈ Ω t }. In many cases, the communication counts {y i,j,t : i, j ∈ [n], t = 1, . . . , T } are prone to random fluctuations that arise from noise in the observed process. If not accounted for, direct monitoring of counts may lead to false discovery. To reduce this possibility, we smooth the observed counts using a reflective EWMA strategy (Gan, 1993) .
To begin, we first obtain a collection of smoothed values { y i,j,t : i, j ∈ [n], t = 1, . . . , T } using an EWMA strategy. Fix α ∈ [0, 1], and define
Denote the expected value of y i,j,t by λ i,j,t . The expected values of these smoothed counts can be calculated using the following recursion
In the above recursion, the initial values are set as y i,j,0 = λ i,j,0 = λ i,j,1 . Here, α acts as a smoothing parameter that dictates the temporal memory retained in the stochastic
Large values of α retain less memory and result in less smoothing. In our applications, we fix α to 0.075 based on the previous analysis and suggestion of Sparks and Patrick (2014) .
Notably, the EWMA in (1) will not reflect a change in the observed count process in the scenario that y i,j,t decreases immediately before a significant (anomalous) increase. To avoid this worst-case scenario, we use the reflective boundary EWMA process {y *
The reflective boundary EWMA specified in (2) is robust to sudden oscillations in the count process. Our surveillance plans will utilize the smoothed counts from (2) rather than the originally observed counts.
Monitoring a Known Team of Actors
We begin by considering the simplest case when the target team Ω t is known a priori. In both this section and Section 4, we will make use of two tunable parameters -α ∈ [0, 1]:
a smoothing parameter that controls the extent to which a proposed EWMA statistic has temporal memory, and h(·, ·): threshold functions that are chosen to control false discovery of the proposed monitoring plan. We fix α = 0.075 based on previous analysis conducted in Sparks and Patrick (2014) . The threshold functions h(·, ·) are chosen via simulation of the monitored process. We describe how these are chosen in detail in the Appendix.
Throughout this and the following section, let y i,j,t and y * i,j,t be the EWMA and reflective boundary EWMA defined in (1) and (2), respectively. Further, we denote n Ωt = |Ω t | as the number of individuals in the team.
Ω t is a Collaborative Team
We first consider monitoring for outbreaks among a collaborative team Ω t , wherein all members of Ω t are expected to communicate regularly. An outbreak in a collaborative team is reflected by a large average number of communications between members i, j ∈ Ω t .
To detect such outbreaks, we analyze the mean, µ Ωt , of the smoothed interactions in the collection defined as
In the case that Y is homogeneous, note that µ Ωt = n 2 Ωt λ. We use a group -EWMA (GEWMA) statistic to identify outbreaks among the actors in Ω t . The GEWMA t process is defined by the following recursion
where the initial value GEWMA 1 = i∈Ωt j∈Ωt y i,j,1 .
For homogeneous networks, we use the GEWMA t process from (4) and flag an outbreak within the team Ω t when
where h G (n Ωt , λ) is designed to give the plan a low false discovery rate. Importantly, the square root transform of the GEWMA t process in (5) stabilizes the variance of the process to a constant value (see Bartlett (1936) ). Thus, the left hand side of (5) 
In practice, a target team Ω t may purposefully reduce their communication levels prior to, say, planning a crime, which may hamper early detection when using the GEWMA t statistic defined in (4). To avoid this scenario, one can alternatively use a reflective boundary GEWMA statistic defined as
and apply an analogous plan as defined in (6).
Ω t Has a Dominant Leader
We now consider the scenario in which the target team Ω t has a known dominant leader
. We expect that ν will have a high level of communication with the members of Ω t , but unlike the collaborative team setting, the members of Ω t do not neccessarily significantly interact with one another. In this case, an outbreak is signalled when there is either a significant rate of communications between ν and the members of Ω t , or by a significant rate of interactions among the members of Ω t . As we primarily need to be concerned with the communications between a single actor and a collection of actors, we develop a monitoring strategy that exploits sparsity in the interactions among the members 
Next we refine the team W ν,t to include only those members who share a significant number of communications. We set
The value k is a suitable constant that helps identify members of the target group and is chosen to control the size of the team Ω t . We consider the choice of k in our simulation study in Section 5. To monitor Ω t , we use the dominant leader EWMA (DEWMA) statistic, defined as
When ν is known, we can use the DEWMA statistic from (10) to flag outbreaks in a dominant leader team. In the case that Y is homogeneous, we flag an outbreak when
Above, h D (n Ωt , λ) is chosen to control false discovery. Once again simulations suggest that the square root transformation rids the dependence of the threshold h D (n Ωt , λ) on λ.
Thus, we use the following general surveillance plan for heterogeneous networks when ν is known
We note that when the team and dominant leader are both unknown, the plan in (12) is complicated by the fact that we must estimate ν and Ω t . We discuss our strategy to handle this in Section 4.
Global Outbreaks
We now consider the case when there is a significant increase in the number of interactions among every pair of actors in the network, i.e., when Ω t ≡ [n] for all t. One can generally detect this anomaly early by monitoring the aggregated interactions over the target network.
To monitor the network for a global outbreak, one can directly extend the GEWMA t statistic from (4) to the entire network. Note that in the case that Ω t ≡ [n], we have from (3) that
Following our previous development of the GEWMA t statistic in (4), we define the total-EWMA (TEWMA) statistic using the following recursion
where
, and α ∈ [0, 1] is chosen to smooth the TEWMA process. Using the statistic in (13), we flag a global outbreak in homogeneous networks
The threshold h T (n, λ) designed to give the plan a low enough false discovery rate, and is chosen in the same manner as plan (5). As before, h T (n, λ) does not depend on the expected communication counts due to the square root transform. Hence, in general we flag an outbreak in heterogeneous networks when
To avoid issues arising from sudden oscillations in counts, we can instead use the reflectedboundary TEWMA statistic
and apply the plan given in (15).
Monitoring of an Unknown Team of Actors
In many applications, Ω t is not known a priori. In this situation, there are two primary difficulties that one must address. First, the unknown team must be efficiently estimated.
An exhaustive search for an anomalous team has complexity of order n n Ω t ; thus, it is important to employ scalable approaches for estimation. When Ω t is known, the GEWMA t and DEWMA ν,t statistics are invariant to variations in the communication means. However,
when Ω t is unknown these statistics are no longer invariant to heterogeneous communication rates through time. Thus the second complication comes in adapting the monitoring plan for a changing mean in heterogeneous networks. In this section we describe a local search strategy to identify densely connected teams on which our proposed statistics can be used for monitoring. Since the global outbreak plan in (15) is invariant to mean changes, we only need to consider the scenarios when Ω t is either a collaborative team or a dominant leader team.
Estimating Unknown Teams
Here, we describe our local search strategy to estimate collaborative teams as well as teams with a dominant leader.
Collaborative Teams
When the target team is unknown and collaborative, we propose monitoring a collection of densely connected teams Ω C,t := { Ω ,t : ∈ [n]} at each time t. We define a candidate
team Ω ,t as one in which all constituent members significantly interact. In particular, for each ∈ [n] and each time t, we identify the candidate team
Above, k is a suitable constant with good detection properties and is chosen via simulation.
Our specification of each candidate team Ω ,t is motivated by empirical properties of real networks. One can view Ω ,t structurally as a hub with center node . Hub structures commonly arise in sparse social and biological networks as well as the well-studied scale-free family of networks (Barabási and Albert, 1999; Tan et al., 2014) . Thus if the unknown team is suspected to be a collaborative team, we propose monitoring at most n densely connected teams.
Dominant Leader Teams
When the dominant leader ν and target team Ω t is unknown, we monitor a collection 
We next refine the team W ν,t to include only those members who share a significant number of interactions. Namely, we specify the team Ω ν,t as
The value k is a suitable constant that helps identify members of the target group with larger than expected communications with the dominant leader ν. We note that rather than a normal standardized score to identify Ω t , we use a 'signal-to-noise' team identification scheme in (18) as this strategy can efficiently avoid unusual changes that involve very low communication levels.
Adapting the Plans for Heterogeneous Networks
Once the candidate teams 
When the observed network is homogeneous, one can readily monitor collaborative and dominant leader teams by using plans (6) and (11), respectively, for the local GEWMA and DEWMA statistics in (20) and (21). When the network is heterogeneous, we develop an adaptive plan for surveillance as follows. Note that for a fixed candidate collaborative team Ω ,t , the plan in (6) can be re-expressed as
Importantly the threshold in plan (22) no longer depends on the observed data. We exploit this property and define an adaptive plan using the local adaptive group-EWMA (AGEWMA) statistic:
For an unknown team Ω t , a communication outbreak is flagged when
for any ∈ [n]. Here, the team must be re-estimated at each time period t. This adaptive plan in (24) has the same in-control ATS value used to design the homogeneous plans for all
We can use a similar adaptive plan to identify communication outbreaks in candidate dominant leader teams. Define the local adaptive dominant leader -EWMA (ADEWMA) statistic by
Using an analagous argument as above for the adaptive GEWMA plan, we flag a communication outbreak among dominant leader teams when
for any ν ∈ [n]. There are two distinct scenarios in which an outbreak will be flagged by the plan (26). In the first scenario, an outbreak is detected if the team size of any candidate team significantly increases. This is likely to happen when, for instance, a leader of an organized crime is trying to recruit a team. In the second scenario, an outbreak is detected when the number of interactions within any candidate team significantly increases. This can occur in two ways: (i) when individuals within the same team interact more with individuals outside of their current group, or (ii) members of the group interact significantly more frequently among themselves. Combinations of (i) and (ii) may also flag communication outbreaks.
Simulation Study
We now access the utility of our proposed surveillance plans on a test bed of simulated networks. We consider two types of communication outbreaks among small target teams. In the first scenario, we simulate a collaborative team outbreak, where every actor in a small and unknown team is involved in the outbreak. In the second scenario, the target team has an unknown dominant leader whose communication levels with the remaining team undergoes an outbreak. For each of these cases, we investigate the effectiveness of the GEWMA and DEWMA strategies.
For each simulation, we generate 100 in-control networks followed by 500 networks that have undergone an outbreak. We record the time to signal -the number of networks after the change until a signal is flagged -of the DEWMA and GEWMA plans and repeat the experiment 10000 times for the collaborative team outbreak and 1000 times for the dominant leader outbreak. To evaluate the performance of a plan, we record the average time to signal (ATS) over the collection of simulations. We present the results for all simulations in Tables   1 -12 in the Appendix.
Collaborative Team Outbreaks
Tables 1 through 10 outline the detection properties of simulated collaborative team outbreaks for networks of size n = 100. To simulate an outbreak, we select a fixed but hidden
team Ω ⊆ {1, . . . , 100}. In the first 100 in-control networks, communication counts among the nodes in Ω have mean λ. In the remaining networks, the nodes in Ω have an increased mean communication count of (1 + δ)λ. We simulate networks with target teams of size n Ω = 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. For each time series of networks, we estimate candidate collaborative teams and dominant leader teams via (17) and (19) and then apply the GEWMA and DEWMA plans from (5) and (11), respectively.
The GEWMA t Plan
In the first part of our study, we simulate homogeneous target networks with mean communication counts of either λ = 0.20 or 0.70. We investigate significance thresholds k between 0.05 and 0.40 in increments of 0.05. We extend the first simulation to seek the best plan for detecting the collaborative team Ω, when n Ω = 6 and n = 100. We investigate significance thresholds of k between 0.40 and 0.70 for expected communication rates of λ = 0.20, 0.40 and 0.70. Together, Tables   1 and 2 indicate that k = 0.60 is the best choice for all λ and Ω involving 6 of the 100 actors. Furthermore we find that the performance of the GEWMA plan strongly depends on an appropriate choice of k; the detection performance of the GEWMA plan is dramatically improved for k = 0.60.
We repeat the collaborative team outbreak simulation for a target team of size 7, 8, 9, and 10. In each simulation, we seek the best significance threshold k for homogeneous networks with mean communication λ = 0.20, 0.40 and 0.70. We report the ATS over 10000 simulations for each of these settings in Tables 3 -6 . Our results suggest that k = 0.50 is the best choice for all λ when n Ω is 8, 9, or 10, while k = 0.50 or 0.60 is most suitable for networks where the target team is of size 7. This result suggests that there is an inverse relationship between the optimal value of k and the size of the target team. This is helpful in deciding the choice of k for the GEWMA plan, and it appears that k = 0.50 is a robust choice for the outbreaks considered in this study.
The DEWMA ν,t Plan
Tables 7 -10 report the results of the DEWMA surveillance plan on the collaborative team outbreaks described above for target teams of size 6, 7, 8, and 9. For each setting, k = 0.45 tends to be the best choice for significance threshold. The only exception is in the case that the team is of size 9 and the mean communication is λ = 0.70, in which case k = 0.40 is the better choice.
Comparison of the GEWMA t and DEWMA ν,t Plans
In comparing the results for the GEWMA and DEWMA plans on the collaborative team outbreak simulation, we find that in general the GEWMA plan outperforms the DEWMA plan. In particular, the GEWMA strategy detects the collaborative team sooner than its counterpart. For example when δ = 1 and λ = 0.2, the strategy based on GEWMA t in Table 2 had an ATS equal to 11.62 (k = 0.60) whereas the technology based on DEWMA ν,t in Table 7 had an ATS equal to 12.90 (k = 0.45). Similarly, when δ = 0.50 and λ = 0.70; the GEWMA t strategy had an ATS equal to 8.54 (k = 0.50); whereas, the DEWMA ν,t plan had an ATS of 8.87 (k = 0.40).
Is the Methodology fit-for-purpose?
In order to judge whether the technology is fit for purpose we consider the monitoring of a crime. To be effective, we would like our strategy to flag the planning of a crime within seven days. We assume the following specifications of team behavior:
1. In order to plan a crime, team members should call each other at least 0.5 per day during the planning phase. We consider this to be the lowest level of communication necessary to plan a crime.
2. The planning stage of the crime would result in at least a doubling of their usual communication intensity during this planning stage.
3. The usefulness specification is that detection should be well within 7 days of the start (i.e., the out-of-control ATS < 7).
The last specification allows law enforcement agencies enough time for appropriate detective work to be carried out and potentially avoid catastrophic events such as terrorism.
The optimal plan for λ = 0.4 and 0.7 pass the usefulness test by flagging within seven days on average for all groups (e.g., with λ = 0.4, k = 0.6 the GEWMA t statistics detect the outbreak on average in 6.93 days). On the other hand, when the overall communication in the network is relatively sparse (λ = 0.2), this fit for purpose test is only met for collaborative teams having 8 or more members.
Dominant Leader Team Outbreaks
We now investigate the performance of the GEWMA and DEWMA plans when the outbreak occurs among a fixed but unknown dominant leader team in a homogeneous dynamic network. We simulate the networks with the same specifications as the collaborative team study in Section 5.1, except now the outbreak only occurs on a fixed subset of communications in the team (rather than throughout the entire team as in the collaborative team scenario). In particular, we consider four different dominant leader teams where a communication outbreak occurs on the directed edges shown in Figure 5 .2. In each of these four teams, team member 6 is assumed to be the dominant leader and communicates with all other members of the team. We assess the performance of the GEWMA and DEWMA plans on these dominant leader outbreaks and report the results in Tables 11 and 12 . Our results suggest that again the choice of k plays an important role in establishing the best performing monitoring strategy.
Furthermore, across all values of λ k, and n Ω , we found that the DEWMA method outperformed the GEWMA strategy in this simulation study. Both methods witness improved performance as the signal to noise ratio (δ) increases. Our results provide empirical evidence that the DEWMA plan is an effective strategy when the target team has a dominant leader, or when the team is more sparsely connected than a collaborative team.
Heterogeneous Networks with no Outbreak
We now assess the performance of the ADEWMA plan from (26) on heterogeneous networks that undergo no outbreak, but whose size changes through time. Without loss of generality, we fix the mean communication count between node i and j at time t as λ i,j,t = a|i − j| + 0.90, for a fixed constant a < 0. This specification gives a higher likelihood of communication between nodes that are close to one another in the ordering of the nodes.
To vary the size of the network through time, we fix lower (m L ) and upper bounds (m H ) and select the size of the t th network n t by randomly drawing a discrete value uniformly from
As there is no outbreak in our simulated collection of networks, we seek a plan that identifies no change for some fixed number of time steps. By investigating this aspect of the ADEWMA plan, we can better understand how to control the number of false discoveries under a null model where no outbreak is present. For our current study, we seek an ADEWMA plan that delivers an ATS of 100. We note that one could alternatively seek an ATS of 370 to match the standard three sigma strategy of Shewhart control charts, but the choice is arbitrary. We vary the values of a, m L , and m H and identify the threhold adjustment that acquires the desired ATS over 1000 simulations. The threshold adjustments and calculated ATS are provided in Table 13 .
The simulation results in Table 13 reveal that the ADEWMA plan with threshold 0.984 has an in-control ATS closest to the desired value of 100 when m H > 135. On the other hand, when m H ≤ 135 selecting a threshold of 1 delivers the best plan. These results suggest that the ADEWMA plan is robust to large changes in the size of the network from one time to the next. In many applications (like our application in Section 6), the size n t is likely to have a small variation over time. We find that in these situations the ADEWMA plan witnesses an improvement in overall robustness.
Application to U.S. Congressional Voting
We now apply the GEWMA monitoring plan from (6) Predictable behavior is regarded as in-control. To model in-control behavior, we use a logistic regression model to predict whether two senators will vote the same on a newly submitted bill. We fit a logistic model to estimate the probability that a senator (Senator A)
would vote the same as another senator (Senator B) using the following predictors: (a) the political affiliation of each senator (Senators A and B), (b) which party had a majority in the Congress, (c) the proportion of that majority, and (d) the proportion of representation of Senator A's political affiliation. The expected number of votes from Senator A to Senator B was calculated by multiplying the predicted probability from the logistic regression by the total number of votes for that senator. This count was assumed to be Poisson distributed with in-control mean given by this expected count.
In this application we are interested in both unusually high counts and unusually low counts. Therefore we run two one-sided charts. In particular, for a target team Ω t we analyze the GEWMA t statistic from (4), as well as the lower GEWMA (L-GEWMA t ) statistic defined by L-GEWMA t = min(α i∈Ωt j∈Ωt
where α was fixed to be 0.075. The plans are trained using simulation to deliver an incontrol false alarm rate of 200. The GEWMA and L-GEWMA curves were calculated from two sources (i) the likelihood of Republicans voting with Democrats, and (ii) the likelihood of Democrats voting with Republicans. We do not expect our co-voting patterns to remain incontrol and predictable; thus, we are particularly interested in identifying sustained periods of unusual behavior.
The GEWMA and L-GEWMA curves are plotted in Figure 1960 -1980) in which Republican party members were known to hold particularly moderate views like the former governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller (Rae, 1989; Smith, 2014) . This finding was also identified using network surveillance techniques in Wilson et al. (2016) .
Discussion
This paper introduces novel and computationally feasible surveillance plans for identifying communication outbreaks in dynamic networks. In the worst-case scenario when the target team is unknown, the proposed method monitors at most n 2 candidate teams, which dramatically improves the computational memory needed for an exhaustive search. Our new plan uses a general multivariate EWMA approach to accumulate temporal memory of communication counts. The approach can easily be extended to situtations with more than one communication channel. Plans were extended to handle networks with heterogeneous mean counts (as in the application) and the value of our proposed plans was further demonstrated with simulated applications.
In our simulation study, we found that our new approach is able to effectively identify outbreaks even when the outbreak covers a small number of communications (< 1% of total communications). These results suggest that the technology will be particularly useful in crime management as crime is typically committed by gangs of a small size (A Morgan and W Shelley, 2014). Furthermore, we believe that law enforcement agencies would value our proposed technique as it could be used to help gain insights on persons of interest, e.g., it
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could be applied juvenile crime rings as a preventative tool to help reduce repeat offenders.
We found that when the outbreak is global across all communications of the targeted people, using the TEWMA t plan is the best approach and this plan is invariant of the distribution of communication counts in the target network. If the communication outbreaks involves a small sub-group of the targeted people then the group-EWMA (GEWMA t ) plan has best performance. As the size of the outbreak group is seldom known in advance, applying these plans simultaneously in a single plan may offer a more robust means to detect the full range of potential outbreaks.
Our proposed technique motivates several areas of future research. For example, future work should explore the potential of extending this approach to cover geographic dimensions (see Carley et al. (2013) ) to account for the spatial nature of observed dynamic systems.
Furthermore, one can explore other ways of estimating the target team for monitoring.
New approaches could involve defining people in the targeted network with either increased connectivity or historically a high connectivity. The target group itself could be regarded as varying according to whether they achieve a certain level of connectivity with the leaders, or average connectivity within the target group. In principle, one could also estimate teams of individuals that are most densely connected at time t using a community detection or extraction algorithm on the network Y t (Lancichinetti et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2014) . Alternatively, one could identify candidate teams in a network with statistically significant edges using a p-value technique like that developed in Wilson et al. (2013) .
Finally, this paper arbitrarily selected the temporal smoothing parameter α = 0.075.
Therefore future research effort could be devoted to selecting an appropriate value for the multivariate temporal smoothing. We believe that this effort should be devoted either to establishing an appropriate robust choice for α, or to alternatively varying the choice of α for each communication count so as to exploit local trends in the network such as the work done in Capizzi and Masarotto (2003) .
Appendix Specification of Threshold Values
Simulation methods were used to estimate the thresholds for the DEWMA ν,t and GEWMA t plans so as to deliver an in-control ATS of approximately 100. The thresholds for both the collaborative team and the dominant leader team were established in the identical manner.
To avoid redundancy, we will describe the simulation procedure to determine thresholds in the collaborative team scenario.
For the DEWMA ν,t plan, we simulated networks of size n = 100, 125, 150, . . . , 375, 400.
For each network, we fixed the temporal memory as α = 0.10 and generated homogeneous networks with mean counts equal to λ = 0. 01, 0.02, 0.03, . . . , 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, . . . , 0.95, 1.0. For each combination, the thresholds h D (λ, n) are estimated to obtain the fixed ATS. These values were then used to build the following regression model:
+ β 8 log(λ) + β 9 n log(λ) + β 10 nλ + β 11 nλ 2 + error.
Once fitted, the above regression model was used to estimate the thresholds for the For the GEWMA t plan, we estimated the threshold h G (λ, n) in a similar way as above.
We generated networks of size n = 100, 125, 150, . . . , 975, 1000, fixed α = 0.10, and simulated homogeneous networks with mean counts λ = 0. 01, 0.02, 0.3, . . . , 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, . . . , 0.95, 1.0. For each combination, we estimated the threshold h G (λ, n) through simulation, and then used these estimates to build the following regression model:
1/h G (λ, m) = β 0 + β 1 log(λ) + β 2 n + β 3 n 2 + β 4 n 3 + β 5 λ + β 6 λ 2 + β 7 λ 3 + β 8 log(n) + β 9 log(λ)n + β 10 log(λ)n 2 + β 11 log(λ)n 3 + β 12 nλ + β 13 n 2 λ + β 14 n 3 λ + β 15 λ 4 + β 15 λ log(n) + β 16 λ 5 + β 17 λ 2 log(n) + β 18 λ 3 log(n) + error
The above model estimates the thresholds for the GEWMA t for homogeneous counts and 
Simulation Study Results
Below, we provide tables for the simulation results described in Section 5. 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 2.11 1.10 1.00
1.00 1.00
1.39 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 8.0
1.86 1.07 1.02 1.03 1.14 1.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.35 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.08 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
8.00
1.57 1.04 1.00 1.02 1.09
1.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00
1.00 1.04
1.00 1.100
1.00 
